Power Conversion of Industrial Structure Change and Reform of State Owned Enterprises

Abstract

Abstract:This paper explains the reasons for the reform of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of the transformation of industrial structure and the influence of state-owned enterprises on market development, and meanwhile it provides a tentative explanation for the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises with the logic of marketization. The empirical results show that with the improvement of the market level, the marginal effect of the state-owned enterprises on the rationalization and advancement of the industrial structure is 3.61 and 12.12, respectively; and the choice of the critical time point for the power conversion perspective of industrial structure change is the result of comprehensive trade-offs between the state-owned enterprises and the market, or industrial policy and the competition policy on the overall effect of the rationalization and advancement of the industrial structure; under the premise that the market has replaced state-owned enterprises as the leading of industrial structure change, the influence of state-owned enterprises on the development of the market is a direct reason for the reform of state-owned enterprises. In addition, the paper examines the feasibility of the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in improving the level of Marketization from the aspects of corporate governance structure, asset management mode and industry access, which provides a possible explanation for the choice of the reform path of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.

Key words:Reform of State Owned Enterprises,industrial structure change,industrial policy,competition policy,mixed ownership

CLC Number:

XU Bao-liang, DENG Hong-tu. Power Conversion of Industrial Structure Change and Reform of State Owned Enterprises[J]. Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, 2020(04): 50-60.

References

[1] 潘士远, 金戈. 发展战略、产业政策与产业结构变迁——中国的经验[J]. 世界经济文汇, 2008(1):64~76.
[2] Aghion P, Cai J, Dewatripont M, et al. Industrial Policy and Competition[J]. American Economic Journal:Macroeconomics, 2015, 7(4):1~32.
[3] 韩永辉, 黄亮雄, 王贤彬. 产业政策推动地方产业结构升级了吗?——基于发展型地方政府的理论解释与实证检验[J]. 经济研究, 2017(8):33~48.
[4] 林毅夫. 潮涌现象与发展中国家宏观经济理论的重新构建[J]. 经济研究, 2007(1):126~131.
[5] 林毅夫, 巫和懋, 邢亦青."潮涌现象"与产能过剩的形成机制[J]. 经济研究, 2010(1):4~19.
[6] 宋凌云, 王贤彬. 政府补贴与产业结构变动[J]. 中国工业经济, 2013(4):94~106.
[7] 孙晓华, 李明珊. 国有企业的过度投资及其效率损失[J]. 中国工业经济, 2016(10):109~125.
[8] 褚敏, 靳涛. 为什么中国产业结构升级步履迟缓——基于地方政府行为与国有企业垄断双重影响的探究[J]. 财贸经济, 2013, 34(3):112~122.
[9] 吴意云, 朱希伟. 中国为何过早进入再分散:产业政策与经济地理[J]. 世界经济, 2015(2):140~166.
[10] 李扬, 张晓晶. "新常态":经济发展的逻辑与前景[J]. 经济研究, 2015(5):4~19.
[11] 吴延兵. 国有企业双重效率损失研究[J]. 经济研究, 2012(3):15~27.
[12] 董晓庆, 赵坚, 袁朋伟. 国有企业创新效率损失研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2014(2):97~108.
[13] 仲为国, 李兰, 路江涌,等. 企业进入创新活跃期:来自中国企业创新动向指数的报告——2016·中国企业家成长与发展专题调查报告[J]. 管理世界, 2016(6):67~78.
[14] 李政, 陆寅宏. 国有企业真的缺乏创新能力吗——基于上市公司所有权性质与创新绩效的实证分析与比较[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2014(2):27~38.
[15] 冯晓琦, 万军. 从产业政策到竞争政策:东亚地区政府干预方式的转型及对中国的启示[J]. 南开经济研究, 2005(5):65~71.
[16] 江飞涛, 李晓萍. 直接干预市场与限制竞争:中国产业政策的取向与根本缺陷[J]. 中国工业经济, 2010(9):26~36.
[17] Hansen B E. Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels:Estimation, testing, and inference[J]. Journal of Econometrics, 1999, 93(2):345~368.
[18] Hansen B E. Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation[J]. Econometrica, 2000, 68(3):575~603.
[19] Hansen B E. Inference When a Nuisance Parameter Is Not Identified Under the Null Hypothesis[J]. Econometrica, 1996, 64(2):413~430.
[20] 干春晖, 郑若谷, 余典范. 中国产业结构变迁对经济增长和波动的影响[J]. 经济研究, 2011(5):4~16.
[21] 刘瑞明. 金融压抑、所有制歧视与增长拖累——国有企业效率损失再考察[J]. 经济学, 2011(1):603~618.
[22] 樊纲, 王小鲁, 朱恒鹏. 中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2011.
[23] 王小鲁, 樊纲, 余静文. 中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2017.
[24] 杨建芳, 龚六堂, 张庆华. 人力资本形成及其对经济增长的影响——一个包含教育和健康投入的内生增长模型及其检验[M]. 管理世界, 2016(5):10~18.
[25] 郭杰, 李涛. 中国地方政府间税收竞争研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J]. 管理世界, 2009(11):54~64.
[26] 李梅, 柳士昌. 对外直接投资逆向技术溢出的地区差异和门槛效应——基于中国省际面板数据的门槛回归分析[J]. 管理世界, 2012(1):21~32.
[27] Halonen M. A Theory of Joint Ownership[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1997, 32:5~11.
[28] Matsumura T. Partial privatization in mixed duopoly[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 1998, 70(3):473~483.
[29] Schmitz P W. Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts:The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered[J]. Finanzarchiv Public Finance Analysis, 2000, 57(4):394~411.
[30] Liu G S, Woo W T. How will ownership in China's industrial sector evolve with WTO accession?[J]. China Economic Review, 2001, 12(2):137~161.
[31] Bennett J, Maw J. Privatization, partial state ownership, and competition[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003, 31(1):58~74.
[32] Beladi H, Chao C C. Mixed Ownership, Unemployment, and Welfare for a Developing Economy[J]. Review of Development Economics, 2006, 10(4):604~611.
[33] Ishibashi K, Kaneko T. Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition[J]. Journal of Economics, 2008, 95(3):213~231.
[34] Sarkar S, Sensarma R. Partial privatization and bank performance:evidence from India[J]. Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 2010, 2(4):276~306.
[35] Beirne J, Liu G S, Sun P. The performance impact of firm ownership transformation in China[J]. Working Paper, 2013, No. 1598.
[36] 汤吉军. 不完全契约视角下国有企业发展混合所有制分析[J]. 中国工业经济, 2014(12):31~43.
[37] 郝阳, 龚六堂. 国有、民营混合参股与公司绩效改进[J]. 经济研究, 2017(3):122~135.