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Abstract

Abstract:This paper researches on the relation between real estate investment and performance based on the data of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2015. It is found that that the companies who are with low industry competition or poor governance tend to invest real estate, and their investment intensity is high. In general, the real estate investment will damage the company's market performance (Tobin's Q) and accounting performance (ROA), but it is not obvious in the non-competitive industries. The negative impacts of real estate investment gradually disappear with the improvement of governance level in the competitive industries. The classification studies show that there is a U-shaped relationship. In the case of lower or higher corporate competition or corporate governance, the negative impacts on market performance and accounting performance are small. In other intermediate states, the negative impact is significant. The improvement of accounting performance is only found in the highly competitive product market and poor governance environment accompanied by a significant deterioration in market performance.

Key words:investment real estate,product market competition,corporate governance

CLC Number:

F270

MI Xu-ming, LIU Chun-yu. Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Real Estate Investment-Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms[J]. Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, 2020(04): 18-28.

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Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Real Estate Investment-Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

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