››2018››Issue (03): 64-71.
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WU Ming-xia1,2, XIE Yong-zhen1
Received:2018-01-05Online:2018-05-15Published:2018-05-22CLC Number:
WU Ming-xia, XIE Yong-zhen. The Research of the Relationship between SOE's Past Performance and CEO Forced Turnover under Multiple Situational Factors[J]. , 2018(03): 64-71.
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